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Councils of Government and Nonprofit Community Conferences: 
The Effects of Regional Network Membership on Interlocal Service Delivery 
 
2Councils of Government and their Nonprofit Counterparts: 




Recent theoretical work related to metropolitan governance and regionalism has 
emphasized the importance of networks in fostering collaboration among local governments 
(Feiock, 2007; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Frederickson, 1999). Yet, 
empirical research has failed to examine the effect of network participation on cooperation. Does 
local government participation in regional networks increase the likelihood of interlocal service 
delivery? Multivariate analysis is used to predict the influence of participation in regional 
networks on interlocal service delivery in the Detroit Metropolitan area. Two types of network 
participation are tested: membership in the region’s Council of Government (COG), and 
membership in a smaller, nonprofit “community conference.” Findings indicate that membership 
in the latter increases the likelihood of interlocal service delivery in four of the six public 
services examined, after controlling for a range of economic and demographic characteristics of 
the jurisdiction. Membership in the region’s COG, however, has no effect on interlocal service 
delivery. This finding has several important implications for metropolitan governance. Networks 
matter, but they are not all equally effective in promoting cooperation; variations in network size 
and structure produce differences in cooperation outcomes. Findings further suggest a need to 
look closer at institutional alternatives to councils of government.  
 
3Councils of Government and their Nonprofit Counterparts: 
Does Regional Network Membership Increase Interlocal Service Delivery? 
 
Recent theoretical work related to metropolitan governance and regionalism has 
emphasized the importance of networks in fostering collaboration among local governments 
(Feiock, 2007; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Frederickson, 1999). 
Participation by governing officials in various types of regional networks is thought to be 
particularly critical for enabling voluntary cooperative agreements among jurisdictions, 
cooperation of the sort represented by interlocal contracting.  With a majority of cities and 
counties in the U.S party to at least one, (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1985) interlocal service agreements represent one of the most preferred mechanisms for 
achieving coordination in fragmented metropolitan areas.  
Previous empirical research as has sought to explain interlocal service delivery through a 
variety of contextual factors including economic characteristics of the jurisdiction such as fiscal 
stress (LeRoux and Carr, 2007; Krueger and McGuire, 2005; Wood, 2004; Morgan and 
Hirlinger, 1991; Stein, 1990, Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries, 1977), characteristics of political 
institutions such as form of government (Krueger and McGuire, 2005; Brown and Potoski; 2003; 
Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991), demographic characteristics of the community such as race and 
age (LeRoux and Carr, 2007; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991), and cost-characteristics of the 
service including their degree of capital intensity and labor-intensity (Brown and Potoski, 2003; 
Post, 2002). This research has yielded much mixed evidence about the factors influencing 
cooperation, with the exception of economic factors, which have proven relatively stable in 
predicting the choice of local officials to provide services through cooperative arrangements. 
4Although economic factors are thus acknowledged to account for some of the variation in 
public officials’ decision to cooperate on service delivery, much of the recent literature indicates 
that arriving at such an agreement is unlikely without the aid of networks to foster trust among 
officials and minimize the transaction costs associated with cooperation. Feiock (2007) for 
example, argues that establishment of interlocal agreements is predicated on the existence of 
both information-bridging “weak tie” networks as well as tightly clustered “strong tie” networks 
that enhance that credibility of commitments among local government officials. Similarly, 
Thurmaier and Wood’s (2002) qualitative analysis of the Kansas City metropolitan area suggests 
that dense patterns of overlapping social networks among elected officials, city managers, and 
functional specialists are responsible for the formation and sustenance of interlocal agreements. 
Regional planning agencies such as councils of government, are commonly pointed to as the 
types of networks thought to facilitate interlocal service cooperation (Thurmaier and Wood, 
2002; Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha, 2002; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000; Frederickson, 
1999).  
Despite the frequent pronouncement that network participation by local public officials 
increases prospects for interlocal cooperation, previous research has failed to subject this 
assumption to an empirical test. This analysis draws upon theories of institutional collective 
action and networks to test a model of interlocal service delivery that accounts for the role of 
regional networks in fostering this method of cooperation. Two types of regional networks are 
examined: Membership in regional councils of government (COG), and membership in nonprofit 
COG-like alternatives known as “community conferences.”  The seven-county Detroit 
metropolitan region provides the context for the analysis. Probit analysis is used to estimate the 
likelihood of interlocal service delivery throughout the region in six categories of public 
5services: Police, fire protection, public works, parks and recreation, public works, environmental 
management and economic development. Interlocal service delivery is thought to be a function 
of participation in regional networks, and may also be influenced by a range of economic and 
demographic characteristics of the jurisdiction, which are included as control variables. 
This analysis is based on an assumption that participation in regional networks is one 
factor that may enhance prospects for interlocal service delivery. Thus, the purpose of this 
analysis is not to explore contextual factors promoting interlocal service delivery, but to attend 
directly to question of whether participation in regional networks makes a difference in fostering 
interlocal service delivery. Given the extensive discussion of economic, demographic, and 
institutional factors that promote interlocal service delivery found elsewhere (LeRoux and Carr, 
2007; Krueger and McGuire, 2005; Wood, 2004; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Morgan and 
Hirlinger, 1991), this paper offers only a brief rationale and explanation of these factors. This 
study aims primarily to understand the influence of regional networks on interlocal service 
delivery, while controlling for the aforementioned factors. 
While this analysis is limited to a single metropolitan area, it represents an important first 
step in bridging the gap in what is known about the effectiveness of regional networks in 
promoting cooperative outcomes. Moreover, the Detroit metropolitan region is home to a number 
of smaller COG-like nonprofit institutions, providing a unique opportunity to examine whether 
alternative forms of regional planning networks are effective vehicles for increasing cooperation 
in metro areas. 
 
Institutional Collective Action and Networks 
Both institutional collective action and network theory suggest that local governments 
affiliated through a regional planning agency will be more likely to cooperate through interlocal 
6service delivery. Derived from Olson’s (1965) well-known logic of collective action, Feiock 
proposes a theory of institutional collective action in which local government institutions “can 
act collectively to create a civil society that integrates a region across multiple jurisdictions 
through a web of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by citizens” 
(Feiock, 2004, 6). Institutional collective action represents a “second-generation rational choice 
explanation” for voluntary interlocal contracting among political jurisdictions (Feiock, 2007, 47). 
Fundamental to institutional collective action is the assumption that transaction costs 
limit opportunities for cooperation. To the extent that local officials will have to invest scarce 
time and resources in negotiating agreements and monitoring their enforcement, they have a 
disincentive to enter into cooperative arrangements. Network participation, however, helps to 
minimize transaction costs. Networks provide opportunities for face-to-face interactions that 
build trust among local officials and allow for the establishment of credible commitments that 
reduce the risk of defecting on agreements. As trust among local officials increases, entering into 
cooperative agreements becomes more attractive because bargaining and negotiating the 
agreements requires less time, and the subsequent monitoring and enforcement costs are reduced.  
 In addition to network participation, institutional collective action specifies other 
conditions that facilitate entry into voluntary agreements. Specifically, voluntary cooperation by 
local government institutions is made possible when group size is limited and the jurisdictions 
seeking to cooperate are similar in composition (Feiock, 2007; Post, 2004; Feiock, Tao and 
Johnson, 2004). Institutional collective action predicts interlocal cooperation to be most likely 
when a small number of local governments with homogeneous populations and common policy 
objectives seek to cooperate. As group size increases, heterogeneity and preference divergence 
become increasingly likely, generating high transaction costs. Both inter-jurisdictional 
7homogeneity as well as intra-jurisdictional homogeneity are necessary for interlocal service 
cooperation (Feiock, 2007). The more similar two (or three, etc.) jurisdictions politically and 
demographically, the easier it may be for local officials to trust one another and to reach 
agreement on division of costs and benefits. In a study of interlocal contracting in several large 
metropolitan areas in the U.S., Post (2002) found that similarity of jurisdictions was a consistent 
determinant of local governments’ propensity to cooperate with one another. Homogeneity of the 
population within the jurisdiction also believed to reduce transactions costs.  Oakerson (2004) 
has argued that homogeneity promotes less adversarial politics and allows the community to 
speak with one voice. Uniformity of a jurisdiction’s population permits public officials to make 
decisions and act on the community’s behalf with greater confidence that citizen preferences are 
given appropriate expression. Indeed, previous research has found intra-jurisdictional 
homogeneity to be positively linked to greater interlocal cooperation (Feiock and Park, 2005; 
Krueger and McGuire, 2005). 
Networks are described as both a precondition to institutional collective action (Feiock, 
2007; Cigler, 1994) and to arise from it (Feiock, Tao, and Johnson, 2004). Networks are 
fundamental to institutional collective action, as they aid in minimizing transaction costs that 
serve as obstacles to negotiating and maintaining agreements. Repeated interactions are an 
inevitable part of network membership, giving rise to norms of trust and reciprocity that are 
reinforced among participants over time.  
Social network theory suggests that two or more jurisdictions linked through a regional 
planning agency will be more inclined to cooperate on service delivery than those that share such 
an affiliation. Metropolitan-wide councils of government represent a type of “weak-tie” network. 
Granovetter’s (1973) classic theoretical manifesto on the strength of “weak ties” demonstrates 
8the value brought to individual actors by cultivating as many non-redundant casual contacts as 
possible. Regional networks provide a forum for local public officials to associate with one 
another and increase the scope of their casual contacts.  Increasing evidence from the network 
location studies indicates that it is not simply one’s position within a network that is important, 
but rather the number of boundary-spanning contacts an actor has may be even more important 
for enabling that actor to get ahead (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1983).  
Within the social network research, a vast literature on role-sets confirms the dependence 
between different sets of ties linking any given pair of actors (Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman, 
2005). To illustrate, when two jurisdictions are share a tie as members of a regional planning 
agency, their likelihood of sharing a tie through an interlocal contract is substantially increased. 
Lackey, Freshwater, and Rupasingha (2002) found through that opportunities for local officials 
to interact through a neutral facilitator, such as a COG or regional organization, increased the 
likelihood of actors cooperating on community development projects. Similarly, Thurmaier and 
Wood (2002) suggested that the metropolitan planning organization served a brokering capacity 
in establishing interlocal agreements among local governments in their analysis of the Kansas 
City metro region. Thus, regional networks may play a significant role in enhancing the 
prospects that for voluntary interlocal service agreements will emerge. 
 
Regional Networks: Councils of Government and Community Conferences  
Since the time they were brought into widespread existence by the 1965 Housing and 
Urban Development Act, Councils of Government (COGs) have remained one of the most 
common and visible forms of voluntary cooperation among local governments in metropolitan 
areas. While COGs are instrumental in bringing federal grant monies into metropolitan areas for 
9transportation and regional planning, many urban scholars have criticized COGs as being 
incapable of achieving regional cooperation on any meaningful scope or scale (Stephens and 
Wikstrom, 2000; Zimmerman, 1983; Frisken, 1973; Barnes, 1969). Much of the inability of  
COGs to secure metro-wide cooperation stems from inherent limitations of these institutions, 
including include their lack of coercive authority, and their unit representation structure that 
creates disincentives for some jurisdictions to become members. These limitations are thought to 
derive from the fact that COGs are voluntary associations; membership is optional, so metro-
wide cooperation is only possible to the extent each jurisdiction participates. However, even in 
the unlikely event of full participation, COGs abilities for ensuring metro-wide commitment to 
regional policies would be limited by their lack of legal authority necessary to enforce policy 
decisions.  
Another challenge of COGs is their membership size and diversity. Their size and 
diversity of member interests pose technical and political feasibility problems for orchestrating 
metro-wide cooperation of any substance. To the extent that some jurisdictions will benefit 
disproportionately, and others would bear disproportionate costs, cooperation that COGs might 
initiate to ensure more equitable service levels among jurisdictions are stifled by political 
feasibility. Technical feasibility problems are created as function of COGs membership size. 
Coordination costs increase with each additional party to an agreement, and as group size 
increases, voluntary cooperation becomes increasingly less likely. Fragmented metropolitan 
areas are patchworks of pluralist interests, and thus the size and diversity of jurisdictions that 
comprise these areas pose limits to metro-wide cooperation, even in the hypothetical event of full 
COG participation. Metropolitan-wide COGs ultimately represent a type of “weak tie” network, 
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in which members are loosely associated or casually acquainted, yet linked together by the 
“information bridging” function (Feiock, 2007) performed by these regional institutions.   
While COGs limitations in realizing regional cooperation are often attributed to the fact 
they are voluntary associations, it is important to consider that COGs are only one type of 
voluntary association. The distinct lack of research on other forms of voluntary organizations 
with regional missions suggests a need to examine these institutions closer. Over the past forty 
five years, a vast voluntary sector has emerged in America’s metropolitan areas that has been 
largely overlooked by urban scholars. Urban nonprofits have adopted a diverse array of social, 
economic, and political functions that have traditionally been reserved for other sectors and other 
types of institutions (Hula and Jackson-Elmoore, 2000). For example, regional planning is a 
function performed by one specific type of nonprofit organization, described as a “community 
conference.” Community conferences are nonprofit organizations that are similar in structure and 
function to COGs but are smaller in their membership size and the geographic space they cover.    
As regional nonprofit planning agencies, community conferences share a number of 
similarities with COGs. Most importantly, they both represent types of regional networks and 
both are voluntary associations. Voluntary associations are defined as “formally organized 
groups with fixed rules on admission, election of officers, and procedure for meetings, usually 
set down in a written constitution or by-laws, formed to serve specific goals that are voluntarily 
organized and joined,” (Doyle, 1977, 333). Moreover, community conferences are similar to 
COGs in that they are comprised of dues-paying member local governments, and are governed 
by a board consisting of one elected official from each participating jurisdiction.  
Nonprofit community conferences, however, differ from COGs in some important ways. 
Perhaps most significantly, they have a much smaller membership than COGs (eighteen to 
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twenty member jurisdictions) and are comprised mainly but not exclusively, of contiguous 
jurisdictions. Moreover, these organizations formed at the willful initiative of the political 
leaders of the member jurisdictions, who organized to form a nonprofit with a mission related to 
regional improvement, and representing the interests of member local governments. Thus, the 
planning objectives of these agencies tend to be more localized or “sub-regional” than those of 
metropolitan-wide councils of governments. Nonprofit community conferences are therefore 
regarded as “strong tie” networks in which members are tightly clustered in spatial and relational 
terms, and credible commitments might be more easily forged.  
Nonprofit community conferences also enjoy certain advantages that COGs do not have, 
as a result of their federal tax-exempt status. These organizations are exempt from paying sales 
tax, state and federal income tax, and local property tax, freeing up resources to devote to 
member services and other activities related to the organization’s regional mission. Equally 
important however, is the revenue-generating benefits created by the organizations’ 501(c)(3) 
legal status. This designation, granted by the federal Internal Revenue Service permits 
community conferences to appeal to the public for donations if they choose to do so. The 
contributions made by private citizens to these organizations are tax deductible under the 
501(c)(3) code, which provides community conferences with significant fund-raising advantages.  
How effective are these “weak-tie” and “strong-tie” regional networks in promoting 
interlocal service delivery? Prior to answering this question, a brief discussion of the “strong-tie” 
nonprofit regional networks examined in this analysis is in order. Although COGs are a well-
known form of regional network that is found in virtually every major metropolitan area, the 
nonprofit community conference is a relatively unique type of regional network. To better 
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illustrate the mission and functions of these regional networks, a brief description of the 
nonprofit community conference follows.  
 
Nonprofit Regional Networks: Community Conferences in Metro Detroit 
As nonprofit regional planning agencies, The Downriver Community Conference (DCC) 
and the Conference of Western Wayne (CWW), both located in the metropolitan Detroit area, are 
two examples of “strong-tie” regional networks. These particular nonprofits share many 
similarities with COGs in that they are voluntary associations, comprised of dues-paying 
member local governments, and are governed by a board consisting of one elected official from 
each participating jurisdiction. However, these organizations are distinctly different from COGs 
in some important ways. Perhaps most importantly, they have a much smaller membership (18-
19 local governments). Moreover, the political leaders of these jurisdictions self-organized to 
form a nonprofit agency to represent their interests and to maximize state and federal funding 
opportunities through collaborative grant applications. Thus, the planning objectives of these 
agencies tend to be more localized than those of metropolitan-wide councils of governments.  
Although variations of the regional nonprofits examined here may exist in other 
metropolitan areas, these two particular agencies located in the Detroit Metro area are thought to 
represent relatively unique organizations. To the extent that multi-jurisdictional cooperation 
might increase as a result of local governments’ membership in such an organization, they are 
worthy of study. The subsequent discussion provides a brief description of the regional 
nonprofits that serve as the “strong-tie” regional networks in this analysis.   
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Downriver Community Conference 
The Downriver Community Conference (DCC) is comprised of nineteen municipalities, 
villages, and townships in the southeastern Detroit Metropolitan area. The total population of this 
region is approximately one half million. The mission of the DCC is stated as follows:  
“The Downriver Community Conference partnership provides leadership in establishing 
common, positive goals and strategies to develop the human social and economic assets of the 
Downriver region; enhances the quality of life for area residents, workers and businesses; shapes 
public policy at federal, state, regional, county and local levels; and identifies, obtains and 
responsibly manages the necessary financial resources to successfully implement this vision” 
(DCC, 2005). 
 
The DCC originated in the mid-1960’s as an informal coalition organized by a long-time 
U.S. Congressman representing the region. The coalition became more formalized when the 
original dozen cities successfully applied for a federal job training grant under the Urban 
Opportunity Act of 1967. In 1977, the DCC was officially incorporated as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization. The DCC has a full-time staff of 97 persons, led by a full-time Executive Director. 
The agency is governed by a board of Directors comprised of the elected mayors, village 
presidents, and township supervisors from each of the 19 member communities.  
The organization is a major provider of job training and workforce development 
programs in the region and performs a wide range of functions consistent with its regional 
mission. The DCC administers several grants from the federal Employment and Training 
Administration, and through other state and federal grants, operates a wide range of programs 
including transit, childcare, home repair, and utility assistance programs. The organization also 
provides a number of economic development programs designed to promote small business start-
ups.  
One of the DCC’s goals is planning for regional land use. For example, the agency 
administers a regional brownfield redevelopment program, and a linked greenways project 
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connecting member cities through non-motorized paths. The DCC also functions as the 
coordinating entity for mutual aid and emergency planning and management among the nineteen 
member jurisdictions. Finally, the DCC provides its’ members with political representation by 
lobbying both federal and state policy-makers on proposed legislation that affects the region.  
Conference of Western Wayne  
 
The Conference of Western Wayne (CWW) is comprised of eighteen suburban 
communities covering 340 square miles and encompassing a combined population of 
approximately 700,000 citizens. The mission of the CWW is described as follows: 
 “The CWW serves as a collective program planner and developmental entity and 
provides a forum for the discussion of issues such as legislation, transportation, public safety, 
substance abuse prevention, community and economic development, employment and the 
environmental health of the region. The Conference is the access point for funneling information 
to local units from county, state and federal agencies. In addition, the CWW works as a liaison 
between local government and service organizations by representing its members on various 
committees and boards. The Board works collectively to discuss mutual problems, share 
information and generally improve the quality of life for the residents who live in the area” 
(CWW, 2005). 
 
The CWW originated through informal discussions and meetings of city managers who 
set out to reduce costs for their jurisdictions through joint purchasing. The CWW was 
incorporated as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization in 1980. The organization is operated by three 
full-time staff, including an Executive Director. Like the DCC, the CWW board of directors is 
comprised of the chief elected officials of the member jurisdictions. The CWW is also similar to 
the DCC in that organization serves a conduit for state and federal grant applications. Unlike the 
DCC, the CWW does not function as a provider of social services. Its main purposes are to serve 
as the emergency telephone district for the area, provide political representation for its 
membershiop, and to provide education and training for member communities. The organization 
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also facilitates mutual aid and operates a firefighter testing program that standardizes the 
required qualifications of firefighting personnel across jurisdictions.  
 
Data and Method of Analysis 
The data employed in this analysis are part of a larger research effort to study the service 
delivery choices of Michigan local governments.1 The present analysis relies on the metropolitan 
subset of this dataset, which was collected in the spring of 2005 through a series of mail/web 
surveys to the city managers/administrators, village presidents, and township supervisors of 
every local jurisdiction in the seven-county Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. Table 1 
highlights the total responses rate of the 233 jurisdictions in the seven-county region (67.3 
percent), the response rate of those total 124 respondents that are COG members (68.5 percent), 
and the response rate from the those 34 jurisdictions that are members of a nonprofit community 
conference is (67.5 percent).  
Table 1 about here 
 
Thus, as the table illustrates, the response rates from jurisdictions participating in each 
type of regional network in roughly equivalent, and both are reflective of the overall response 
rate of 67.3%.  It is important to note that COG membership and community conference 
membership are not mutually exclusive forms of network participation; some members of 
community conference may also be COG members.  
Probit analysis was used to estimate the likelihood of cooperation through interlocal 
agreements in six distinct categories of public services, each of which represents a separate 
 
1 The full survey collected data from twenty four counties. Completed responses were received from 468 units, 
representing a 70% rate of response. The full survey asked local officials to indicate the service delivery 
arrangement for 116 different local public services. 
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dependent variable. The likelihood of cooperation is predicted to increase when local 
governments are members of “strong tie” nonprofit community conferences and “weak tie” 
councils of governments, but the former type of network participation may have a greater 
influence than the latter. A series of fiscal and population variables are included in order to 
control for economic and demographic characteristics of the jurisdiction.  
Models are clustered by jurisdiction type (municipality, village, and township) and robust 
standard errors are used. Clustering is used to correct for an unmet assumption of generalized 
regression. An assumption underlying generalized regression methods such as probit is that the 
observations under study are independent across space and time.  With these data however, it is 
unlikely that the dependent responses of each jurisdiction will be completely independent, 
because local governments are most likely to cooperate with their own type. For example, 
townships tend to cooperate more than municipalities, and to cooperate with each other as 
opposed to cooperating with a municipality. Assuming local governments of the same 
jurisdiction type will be more likely to cooperate, there is the potential for correlation of 
dependent response within groups--jurisdiction types of city, village, and township. Clustering 
provides a way of correcting for such serial correlation across space and time, and has proven to 
be a superior method for estimating standard errors (Buckley and Westerland, 2004). 
 
Dependent variables 
Six categories of local public services function as the dependent variables in this analysis: 
police, fire, parks and recreation, public works, environmental management, and economic 
development. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they cooperated with another local 
government for any aspect of each of these services. Cooperation is defined as providing the 
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service to another city/village/township, having another city/village/township provide the service 
for the responding jurisdiction, or the responding jurisdiction reporting it jointly provided the 
service with another city/village/or township. An affirmative response to any of these is treated 
as evidence of interlocal service delivery. All dependent variables are treated as a dichotomous 
response, measured as “1” f the unit cooperates with another local government (city, village, or 




Several independent variables are examined as factors influencing the likelihood of 
cooperation on each of the six public works services described above. Local government 
membership in regional networks is expected to increase the likelihood of interlocal service 
cooperation. Two variables measuring participation in regional networks are examined: 
membership in the region’s council of government and membership in a nonprofit community 
conference. For  both of these variables, membership in the regional network is measured as 
dichotomous variable measured as “1” if the unit is a member and “0” if the unit is not a 
member. 
 Four economic variables are included in the models: intergovernmental revenues, fiscal 
stress, and two measures of community wealth. For those services in which data were available, 
a fifth measure is included that captures the proportion of the jurisdiction’s total expenditures 
devoted to the service examined. Using police services for example, the measure represents the 
proportion of the jurisdiction’s total expenditures devoted to police services. As the proportion of 
expenditures for any one service increases, local governments may be more inclined to turn to 
the use of interlocal agreements in an effort to reduce costs. Intergovernmental revenues are 
measured as the proportion of the jurisdiction’s total budget that comes from county, state, and 
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federal sources, and should decrease the likelihood of interlocal service delivery. Local 
governments receiving large shares of their budget from intergovernmental revenues may have 
less financial motivation for cooperation, because they have adequate finances to cover their 
service costs with the budget enhancement brought by intergovernmental funds.  
The level of fiscal stress experienced by the local government is also expected to increase 
interlocal service cooperation. Consistent with previous analyses (Sharp and Elkins, 1991; 
Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991) fiscal stress is measured by the jurisdiction’s per capita property 
tax. Community wealth is measured in two ways: per capita income, and per capita income 
squared. The squared term is included because previous research has shown the relationship 
between wealth of the population and use of interlocal agreements to be nonlinear (Morgan and 
Hirlinger, 1991). Jurisdictions with low per capita income are likely to be more fiscally stressed 
and therefore more likely to turn to interlocal agreements. Average wealth of the community is 
another factor anticipated to influence the likelihood of interlocal service cooperation. As 
average wealth increases, local governments are more likely to have adequate resources for 
autonomous service provision and may therefore have less incentive to cooperate. Wealthier 
jurisdictions will be less likely to cooperate because they will be able to keep pace with service 
demands and service improvements. However, communities that have very high per capita 
income tend to be small in size, and these governments may opt to purchase goods and services 
from other governments rather than directly provide. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) speculate that 
one reason very wealthy communities are more likely to use interlocal agreements is their 
residents have preferences for a wider array of services, can afford special services, and these 
citizens are more educated and willing to experiment with alternative form of service delivery. 
19
A number of demographic and population characteristics of the jurisdiction may 
influence the likelihood of interlocal service delivery. Total population, population growth and 
decline, and population density all function as indicators of the unit’s propensity for autonomous 
provision. The population variable represents the log of total jurisdiction population. It is 
expected that as population increases, communities will be less likely to use interlocal 
agreements. Population density is measured as the total number of persons per square mile, and 
is also predicted to have a negative effect on cooperation. Population change is measured as the 
percent increase or decrease in jurisdiction population between 1990 and 2000. Communities 
with substantial net population gain are unlikely to use interlocal agreements, but those losing 
population are likely to cooperate.  
Two variables that reflect community demographics are examined; the influence of 
senior citizens, and the influence of racial heterogeneity. Influence of the senior population is 
measured as the proportion of total population age 65 and over. Based on evidence from previous 
research (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991), it is expected that a larger senior population will 
decrease the likelihood of interlocal service delivery. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that 
population of persons aged 65 and over had a deterring influence on cities’ use of interlocal 
agreements. They speculate this is because older persons tend to be more highly engaged in 
community politics, and more likely to favor the status quo. The theory of institutional collective 
action (Feiock, 2007) and arguments by Oakerson (2004) suggest that racial heterogeneity will 
decrease the likelihood of interlocal service cooperation. Oakerson (2004) contends that 
homogeneity of the citizenry enables local public officials to “speak with one voice” in making 
governing decisions on behalf of the local electorate. Thus, the use of interlocal agreements 
decreases as racial heterogeneity increases, since public officials negotiating service-sharing 
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deals will have greater difficulty accommodating diversity of preferences, and thus, will resort to 
direct supply to avoid controversy. Therefore, it is projected that as racial diversity increases, the 
likelihood of using interlocal agreements will decrease. Racial heterogeneity is measured as the 
proportion of total population that is non-white.   
Finally, one measure of access to prospective cooperation partners is included in the 
models. Previous work has demonstrated that access to potential suppliers substantially increases 
the likelihood of interlocal service cooperation (Post, 2002). Access to potential suppliers, which 
can also be described as geographic proximity to other local governments, is measured as the 
total number of local governments with borders directly adjacent to the unit. It is anticipated that 
as the number of neighboring jurisdictions increases, the likelihood of cooperation increases. 
 
Findings 
 Results from the probit analyses estimating the likelihood of interlocal cooperation for 
police, fire, and parks and recreation services are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 about here 
 The first set of results displayed in Table 2 highlights that factors that increase or 
decrease the likelihood of cooperation for police services. The hypothesis that network 
participation is increases the likelihood of participation is only partially supported by the 
findings. Membership in a “strong-tie” community conference network substantially increases 
the likelihood that local governments will cooperate for police services; however membership in 
a “weak-tie” network represented by the region’s COG makes no difference. Consistent with 
prediction, several economic characteristics of the jurisdiction contribute to increased likelihood 
of cooperation. Local governments with higher proportions of their budget from 
intergovernmental sources have a decreased propensity for cooperating on police services, and 
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the hypothesis that a u-shaped relationship exists between average community wealth and 
interlocal service delivery is also supported in the area of police services; as per capita income 
increases, communities are less likely to cooperate because they have adequate resources to 
provide services autonomously, but communities that are very wealthy are more likely to 
cooperate with another local jurisdiction for police services. 
 Many of the same factors predicting cooperation for police also predict interlocal service 
delivery for fire, although a few important differences exist. Membership in “strong-tie” 
nonprofit community conference is again positive and a statistically significant predictor of 
increased cooperation for fire services. Membership in a “weak-tie” regional network is 
statistically significant, but contrary to prediction, COG membership decreases rather than 
increases the likelihood that local governments will cooperate for fire services. The reason for 
this negative relationship is unclear. Intergovernmental revenues again decrease the likelihood of 
cooperation for fire services, consistent with prediction. Population size decreases the likelihood 
of interlocal fire services, meaning that larger jurisdictions cooperate less as they are more likely 
to have the tax base to enable autonomous provision. The number of other local governments 
with borders immediately adjacent to the jurisdiction also increases the likelihood of cooperation 
for fire services. Not only is this finding a signal that access to potential suppliers is important, 
proximity is also a factor in this case, because one of the barriers to cooperation on an essential 
service like fire is that service outcomes (response time) will be compromised. Finally, 
communities with a larger 65 and over population are less likely to cooperate for fire services, 
and this finding is consistent with prediction.  
 The last service examined in Table 2 is parks and recreation. Here, an interesting 
deviation from the rest of the analyses emerges: Membership in a “strong-tie” community 
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conference network is statistically significant, but this variable has a negative, rather than 
positive effect on parks and recreation cooperation. Explanations for this deviation from the 
norm are not immediately apparent. One possibility is that parks and recreation represent 
“lifestyle services” (Williams, 1971) as opposed to essential functions, and therefore local 
governments that provide high quality services and amenities may avoid cooperating for these 
services to prevent residents of other jurisdictions from enjoying their benefits. Thus, even those 
governments linked in a “strong-tie” network would engage in competition to provide a wider 
array and better quality parks and recreation program than their neighbors. Membership in the 
regional council of government bears no influence on the likelihood of interlocal cooperation for 
parks and recreation.  
Once again, intergovernmental revenues reduce the probability of cooperating for parks 
and recreation services. The predicted impact of both community wealth variables are also 
statistically significant; as communities become wealthier they are less likely to cooperate, but 
when they become very wealthy they have an increased likelihood of cooperation. The number 
of other local governments that share borders adjacent to the jurisdiction decreases the 
probability of cooperation for parks and recreation, again pointing to the possibility that this 
local government service is competitive in nature. The older population increases the likelihood 
of cooperation for parks and recreation, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. One 
explanation may be that older citizens are retired and have more time to take advantage of parks 
and recreation programs and facilities and therefore, demand a wider array of services and 
programs than what is feasible for the jurisdiction to provide on its own. 
 Table 3 highlights findings for the models predicting interlocal service delivery on 
public works, environmental management and economic development.  
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Table 3 about here 
 
The first service examined in this table is public works. Membership in a nonprofit community 
conference produces an increased likelihood of interlocal cooperation on public works, but once 
again, COG membership has no effect on cooperation. Two economic variables are statistically 
significant. Higher per capita property taxes decrease rather than increase interlocal cooperation 
on public works. To the extent high per capita property tax is a sign of fiscal stress (Sharp and 
Elkins, 1991; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991), this finding suggests that communities with larger 
tax bases are more inclined to cooperate on public works. This is also demonstrated in the 
statistical significance of the income squared variable. Communities comprised of economic 
elites are more likely to cooperate with other local governments for public works services.   
 Finally, the adjacent borders variable is statistically significant, but reveals an unexpected 
and counterintuitive finding; the greater number of other governments immediately bordering the 
jurisdiction, the less likely it is to cooperate on public works services. Although there is no 
obvious explanation for this outcome, it is possible that it is a function of the way the dependent 
variable is measured. Local governments often cooperate with the county for some types of 
public works functions, and city/village/township cooperation with the county is not captured in 
the interlocal cooperation measures. Since the primary purpose of this analysis is to examine 
whether regional networks facilitate cooperation among local jurisdictions and membership in 
community conferences is not open to counties, the dependent variables captures only service 
cooperation that is horizontal. 
 The next service presented in Table 3 is environmental management, a service with 
classic transjurisdictional properties. Once again, membership in a “strong-tie” community 
conference network increases the likelihood of interlocal cooperation on environmental 
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management. Membership in the region’s COG has no effect on the likelihood of cooperation for 
this service. Of all the services examined in this analysis, it is perhaps most surprising that COG 
membership is not related to increased cooperation on environmental management. This is 
surprising not only because local environmental problems have boundary-spanning 
consequences, but also because many COGs, this one included, receive federal grants to provide 
environmental education and services. Thus, it is expected that the COG might play a 
particularly prominent role in facilitating interlocal cooperation in this area. Other factors that 
influence the likelihood of cooperation include community wealth and having a large number of 
shared borders with other local governments. Per capita property tax reduces the likelihood of 
cooperation, suggesting communities that have healthier tax bases are more likely to cooperate as 
opposed to those that are more fiscally stressed. 
 Lastly, this study examined interlocal agreements for economic development services. 
Given the inherently competitive nature of local economic development (Park, 1997; Peterson, 
1981), it is unsurprising that this model fits less well than any of the others. Despite the influence 
of community conference membership for producing higher cooperation in nearly every other 
public service area, not even these “strong-tie” networks are adequate for overcoming the 
disincentives for local cooperation on economic development. Only two factors are statistically 
significant, both of them population characteristics. Population size significantly reduces the 
likelihood of cooperation. Larger cities are statistically significantly less inclined to cooperate for 
economic development, likely because they are competing for businesses and commercial 
development. Population density on the other hand, increases the likelihood of cooperation. 
More densely populated cities are likely to already be “built out” or lack space for new 
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development, and therefore have an incentive to cooperate with other local jurisdictions on 
development.         
While there are a few differences in the factors explaining the likelihood of interlocal 
service delivery among the various service types, this analysis reveals some discernible patterns. 
Most importantly, membership in a “strong-tie” community conference network is a relatively 
consistent predictor of increased interlocal service delivery. In four of the six public service 
categories examined, community conference membership significantly increases the likelihood 
of local government cooperation on service delivery. By contrast, COG membership makes 
almost no difference in influencing interlocal service delivery rates. Indeed, the sign on the 
coefficients suggests that membership reduces the likelihood of cooperation, but in only in one 
instance (fire) is that relationship statistically significant.  
Taken together, these findings about the role of regional networks suggests that networks 
are not universally capable of producing greater regional cooperation. This analysis finds no 
support for the widely-held assumption that cultivating numerous “weak-ties” will yield greater 
benefits for an actor (local government). However, it does demonstrates that membership in one 
“strong-tie” network may yield more productive outcomes than membership in multiple regional 
networks in which member local governments are only loosely associated and may have 
different needs and policy objectives. 
Other factors that prove to play a role in promoting interlocal service delivery with some 
consistency in this analysis include community wealth (per capita income squared) and access to 
a large number of interlocal contracting partners. Fiscal stress does not appear to be as important 
factor a in promoting interlocal service delivery as conventional wisdom might suggest. 
Intergovernmental revenues decrease cooperation in a number of service categories. A few other 
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economic variables are useful for predicting cooperation rates, but not with any consistency 
across service types, nor in consistent directions. The same is true for the population and 
demographic variables; their statistical significance is sporadic among service categories and 
their effects (positive/negative) are inconsistent. While these factors are of less interest given the 
network focus of this study, their significance in some models points to the importance of 
controlling for economic and population characteristics in this type of analysis. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
The primary purpose of this analysis was to determine whether membership in regional 
networks increases the likelihood that a local government will cooperate through interlocal 
service agreements. Does membership matter? The findings suggest a qualified “yes.”  The 
small-scale nonprofit community conferences examined here that represent “strong-tie” networks 
have a fairly consistent, positive effect on interlocal service delivery. On the other hand, 
metropolitan-wide councils of government representing “weak-tie” networks have no influence 
on interlocal service cooperation. Thus, network membership does seem to make a difference in 
enhancing prospects for interlocal service delivery, but the qualifier is that networks do not 
appear to be equally effective in promoting interlocal service delivery.  The quality of 
relationships and strength of network ties appear to be more important than belonging to a large 
network of relatively disassociated members who have different interests. 
The results of this analysis yields support for the theory of institutional collective action. 
Institutional collective action suggests that voluntary interlocal cooperate will emerge when 
group size is limited, actors are highly similar, and they share common policy objectives. The 
nonprofit community conferences that function as small-scale sub-regional networks seem to 
27
match this description. The structure of community conference networks suggests that group size 
and homogeneity of actors are instrumental to the emergence of cooperation. The finding that 
community conferences are effective for increasing interlocal service delivery while COGs are 
not, suggests that it may not be voluntary nature of COGs that is to blame for the limited 
effectiveness of these institutions. Rather, it is their large membership size and the pluralist 
interests of their members that hamper cooperation. 
Finally, this analysis yields new insights about the potential of alternative forms of 
regional networks. While COGs continue to serve an important role as conduits for federal 
transportation, environmental, and emergency management grants, their limits are well-known 
and thus it may be time to examine alternative forms of regional networks; not as substitutions 
for COGs, but as supplemental institutional structures. The efficacy demonstrated by nonprofit 
community conferences for increasing interlocal service delivery suggests a need to further 
examine ways in which nonprofits and other alternative institutions promote multi-jurisdictional 
cooperation.  
Nonprofits are distinct institutional forms, with different legal status and authority than 
private for-profit firms, government, and quasi-governmental entities such as COGS. Through 
their unique fund-raising capabilities they can bring their own resources to bear on regional 
needs that go unmet by government and the commercial sector. Given that nonprofit institutions 
represent the fastest growing sector of the U.S economy (Independent Sector, 2002), their 
potential for furthering the aims of metropolitan governance is substantial. Future studies of 
regional cooperation should place a premium on investigating how other types of voluntary 
organizations and associations might promote greater metropolitan cooperation and overcome 




Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations. 1985. Intergovernmental Service 
Arrangements for Delivering Local Public Services: Update 1983. Washington, D. C: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
Barnes, Philip W. 1969. Metropolitan Coalitions: A Study of Councils of Government in Texas. 
Austin: Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 
 
Brown, Trevor L. and Matthew Potoski. 2003. Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations 
for Government Service Production Decisions. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 13(4): 441-468. 
 
Buckley, Jack and Chad Westerland. 2004. Duration Dependence, Functional Form, and 
Corrected Standards Errors: Improving EHA Models of State Policy Diffusion. State 
Politics and Policy Quarterly, 4(1): 94-113. 
 
Burt, Ronald S. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Carrington, Peter J., John Scott, and Stanley Wasserman. 2005. Models and Methods in Social 
Network Analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cigler, Beverly A. 1999. Preconditions for the Emergence of Multi-Community Collaborative 
Organizations. Policy Studies Review, 16: 86-102. 
 
Conference of Western Wayne (CWW). 2005. www.c-w-w.org
Downriver Community Conference (DCC). 2005. www.dccwf.org.
Doyle, Don H. 1977. The Social Functions of Voluntary Associations in 19th Century America, 
Social Science History, 1(3): 333-355. 
 
Feiock, Richard C. 2007. Rational Choice and Regional Governance. Journal of Urban Affairs,
29(1): 47-63. 
 
Feiock, Richard C. and Hyung Jun Park. 2005. Bargaining, Networks, and Institutional 
Collective Action in Local Economic Development. Paper prepared for presentation at 
the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting. 
 
Feiock, Richard C. 2004. Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation.
Georgetown University Press: Washington, D. C.   
 
Feiock, Richard C., Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson. 2004. Institutional Collective Action: Social 
Capital and the Formation of Regional Partnerships, in Metropolitan Governance: 
29
Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock. Georgetown University 
Press: Washington, D. C.   
 
Frederickson, H. George. 1999. The Repositioning of American Public Administration. PS: 
Political Science & Politics. (32) 701-711. 
 
Frisken, Frances. 1973. The Metropolis and the Central City: Can One Government Unite Them? 
Urban Affairs Quarterly, 8(3): 395-422. 
 
Granovetter, Mark S. 1983. The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. 
Sociological Theory, 1: 201-233. 
 
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 6:1360- 
1380. 
 
Harrigan, John J., and Ronald K. Vogel. 2003. Political Change in the Metropolis. New York: 
Longman. 
 
Hula, R.C. and Jackson-Elmoore, C. 2000. Nonprofits in Urban America. Westport, CT: Quorum 
Books. 
 
Independent Sector. 2002. The New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference: The Essential Facts 
and Figures for Managers, Researchers, and Volunteers. New York, NY: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. 
 
Krueger, Skip and Michael McGuire. 2005. A Transaction Costs Explanation of Interlocal 
Government Collaboration. Paper presented at the Public Management Research 
Association conference.  
 
Lackey, Steven Brent, David Freshwater and Anil Rupasingha. 2002. Factors Influencing Local 
Government Cooperation in Rural Areas: Evidence from the Tennessee Valley. 
Economic Development Quarterly, 16(2):138-154. 
 
LeRoux, Kelly and Jered B. Carr, forthcoming, 2007. Explaining Local Government Cooperation 
on Public Works: Evidence from Michigan. Public Works Management & Policy, 
 
Morgan, David R. and Michael W. Hirlinger. 1991. Intergovernmental Service Contracts: A 
Multivariate Explanation. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 27(1): 128-144. 
 
Oakerson, Ronald J. 2004.The Study of Metropolitan Governance, in Metropolitan Governance: 
Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock. Georgetown University 
Press: Washington, D. C.  
 
Olson, Mancur.1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
30
Park, Keeok. 1997. Friends and Competitors: Policy Interaction between Local Governments in 
Metropolitan Areas. Political Research Quarterly, 50(4): 723-750.  
 
Peterson, Paul E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Post, Stephanie S. 2004. Metropolitan Area Governance and Institutional Collective Action, in 
Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard C. 
Feiock. Georgetown University Press 
 
Post, Stephanie S. 2002. Local Government Cooperation: The Relationship Between 
Metropolitan Area Government Geography and Service Provision. Paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association conference. 
 
Rawlings, Lynette A. 2003. The Determinants of Cooperation Among Local Governments in 
Metropolitan Areas. Unpublished dissertation, George Washington University. 
Savitch, H. V. and Ronald K. Vogel. 2000. Paths to New Regionalism. State and Local 
Government Review, 32(3): 158-168 
 
Sharp, Elaine B. and David R. Elkins. 1991. The Politics of Economic Development Policy. 
Economic Development Quarterly, 5:126-139. 
 
Sonenblum, S., J. J. Kirlin, and J. C. Ries.1977. How Cities Provide Services. Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger. 
 
Stephens Ross G. and Nelson Wikstrom. 2000. Metropolitan Government and Governance: 
Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Analysis, and the Future. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Stein, Robert. 1990. The Budgetary Effects of Municipal Service Contracting: A Principal-Agent 
Explanation. American Journal of Political Science, 34: 471-502. 
 
Thurmaier, Kurt and Curtis H. Wood. 2002. Interlocal Agreements as Overlapping Social 
Networks: Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas City. Public 
Administration Review, 62(5): 585-596. 
 
Wikstrom, Nelson. 1977. Councils of Government. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, Inc. 
 
Williams, Oliver P. 1971. Metropolitan Political Analysis. New York: Free Press. 
 
Wood, Curtis H. 2004. Metropolitan Governance in Urban America: A Study of the Kansas City 
Region. Unpublished dissertation, University of Kansas. 
 
Zimmerman, Joseph F. 1983. Can Governmental Functions be “Rationally Reassigned?” 




Distribution of Responses 
Total responses Respondents that are 
COG members 
Respondents that are 
community conference 
members 
N (total possible) 157 (233) 85 (124) 23 (34) 
Response rate 67.3% 68.5% 67.7% 
Table 2 
Factors Explaining the Likelihood of Interlocal Service Cooperation:  
Police, Fire, and Parks and Recreation 
Police Fire Parks and 
Recreation 
b se b se b se 
Regional Networks  
COG member -.131 .304 -.450** .209 .205 .417 
Nonprofit community conference member .445*** .120 .930*** .147 -.396*** .071 
Economic Factors  
Police spending .001 .010 -- -- -- -- 
Fire spending -- -- -.017 .011 -- -- 
Parks/Recreation spending -- -- -- -- .003 .014 
Intergovernmental revenues -4.234*** .991 -2.795*** .425 -1.141** .476 
Per capita property tax .000 .000 -.000 .000 .000*** .000 
Per capita income -.000*** .000 -.000 .000 -.000** .000 
Per capita income sq 1.956*** .234 .877 1.176 1.977** .946 
Local/Regional Characteristics  
Unit Population -.111 .112 -.511*** .073 -.067 .119 
Population change (%) -.001 .002 -.004 .006 .001 .005 
Population density .000 .000 -.000 .000 -.000*** .000 
>65 population (%) -3.831 2.510 -2.698* 1.650 3.863* 2.081 
Nonwhite population (%) .003 .011 .001 .013 -.025 .020 
Access to Prospective Partners  
Adjacent borders -.047 .030 .122*** .043 -.236*** .084 
Constant -35.191*** 5.301 -10.837 21.886 -36.104* 18.678 
Pseudo R2 .246  .197  .174  
Log Likelihood -65.620713  -73.397542  -54.474382  
n (observations) 130  132  128  
n (clusters, jurisdiction type) 3  3  3  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3 
Factors Explaining the Likelihood of Interlocal Service Cooperation:  
Public Works, Environmental Management, and Economic Development  




b Se b se b se 
Regional Networks  
COG member .306 .422 -.107 .470 -.234 .308 
Nonprofit community conference member .619*** .171 .625** .277 .370 .257 
Economic Factors  
Public works spending -.003 .005 -- -- -- -- 
Intergovernmental revenues .142 .782 .748 1.241 1.217 1.469 
Per capita property tax -.001** .000 -.000*** .000 .000 .000 
Per capita income -.000 .000 -.000 .000 .000 .000 
Per capita income sq 1.320** .672 1.623** .697 -.591 .793 
Population Characteristics  
Unit population .140 .143 -.003 .103 -.201** .088 
Population change (%) -.004 .002 .000 .006 .010 .007 
Population density .000 .000 .000 .000 .000*** .000 
>65 population (%) 2.793 5.676 1.874 3.336 1.851 3.997 
Nonwhite population (%) .000 .011 -.044 .046 -.002 .005 
Access to Prospective Partners  
Adjacent borders -.046** .021 .097** .043 .032 .029 
Constant -26.830** 12.952 -33.462** 13.824 10.246 14.274 
Pseudo R2 .135  .151  .109  
Log Likelihood -
77.895107 
 -43.288287  -31.553803  
n (observations) 130  134  132  
n (clusters, jurisdiction type) 3  3  3  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
